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Loss or Gain? The Moderating Role of Top Manager Teams in the Relationship between 
Political Hazards and Foreign Subsidiary’s Performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
When political hazards could be threats or opportunities for foreign subsidiary’s 
performance? Combing literature on political hazards and top management teams (TMTs), we 
argue that TMTs in the subsidiary (local TMTs) or dispatched from headquarter play 
distinctive roles in influencing whether multinational companies (MNCs) could reduce costs 
and take advantages of benefits associated with political hazards in their foreign operations. 
We first argue that political hazards are negatively related with foreign subsidiary’s 
performance. Then, more importantly, we propose that local TMTs’ international experience 
in countries with high-level political hazards will weaken the negative relationship between 
political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance while such relationship will be 
strengthened when there is a large number of TMTs dispatched by MNCs’ headquarter. Using 
a panel dataset of 12,362 overseas subsidiaries across 54 countries during the period of 2004 
to 2013, our hypotheses are supported.  
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Political hazard, defined as the presence of instability in a country’s political institutions 
(Delios & Henisz, 2003; W. J. Henisz, 2000; North, 1990), is becoming a salient topic among 
international bussiness scholars and practitioners. There is a growing body of research on how 
multinational companies (MNCs) mitigate political hazards in host countries (Delios & 
Henisz, 2000, 2003; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). These studies have exclusively agreed that 
multinational companies find it hard to survive in countries with high political hazards (Dai, 
Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2007; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; 
Liu, Gao, Lu, & Lioliou, 2016; Song, 2014). A dominant stream of research posits  that 
MNCs are more likely to reduce their exposure to political hazards through risk-avoidance 
strategies such as deterring entry (Delios & Henisz, 2003), reducing foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), lower equity entry mode (Delios & 
Henisz, 2000; Lu, Li, Wu, & Huang, 2018), and diversification (Jiménez, Benito-Osorio, & 
Palmero-Cámara, 2015). However, ironically, as established markets are rapidly becoming 
saturated, we witnessed an increased number of MNCs entering political hazardous countries 
(i.e. China, Africa, and Latin America) (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Khoury, Junkunc, & 
Mingo, 2015; Lu et al., 2018). Another stream of literature has supported this choice by 
arguing that political hazards also could bring growth opportunities and increase firm’s 
performance if MNCs can manage well the risks associated with such an unstable 
environment (Barbopoulos, Marshall, MacInnes, & McColgan, 2014; Click, 2005; Jiménez & 
Delgado-García, 2012; Kobrin, 1979a). These inclusive findings regarding the relationship 
between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance highlight an underestimated 





but important question, that is, how MNCs deal on an ongoing basis with political hazards in 
the foreign subsidiary after they have established majority owned operations in countries with 
high political hazards. In other words, when do political hazards could be a threat or 
opportunity to subsidiary’s performance?   
In this study, we argue that it would be problematic to explain the above puzzle if we 
ignore the contingent role of top manager teams (TMTs) in both the MNCs’ headquarter and 
its subsidiaries. This is because TMTs are the direct decision-makers and first responders to 
the ongoing political hazards in the host countries (Giambona, Graham, & Harvey, 2017; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Their international knowledge or expertise will affect the 
interpretation of the political hazards and, consequently, determine whether MNCs are able to 
reduce costs and increase benefits associated with political hazards in the foreign subsidiaries 
(Giambona et al., 2017; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). 
However, as existing studies on political hazards exclusively focus on how political hazards 
influence international strategies (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), they are largely silent on how 
TMTs’ interaction with local political hazards results in various levels of foreign subsidiary 
performance. Drawing upon political hazard literature and TMTs literature, this study aims to 
fill this gap by introducing the contingent roles of TMTs in the relationship between political 
hazards and foreign subsidiary performance. 
Notably, the MNCs are always facing the dilemma of making best use of local 
knowledge while not losing their control over the foreign subsidiary (Ghoshal, 1987; Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1994). Based on the above assumptions, the current study will divide the 
moderating roles of TMTs into two different perspectives. On the one hand, we expect that 





when foreign subsidiary’s TMTs (or local TMTs) have gained international experience in 
countries with high levels of political hazards, they are more capable of mitigating costs and 
taking advantage of opportunities associated with political hazards. In this light, we expect 
local TMTs international experience in politically hazardous countries will mitigate the 
negative relationship between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance. On the 
other hand, MNCs can dispatch TMTs from headquarters to foreign subsidiaries as expatriates 
to facilitate knowledge transfer and deployment of parent expertise in foreign subsidiaries 
(Chang, Gong, & Peng, 2012; Fang, Jiang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010; Song & Lee, 2017). 
Despite these advantages, the increasing number of TMTs expatriates would increase 
coordination costs and slow down the decision-making process in politically unstable 
countries, which otherwise requires substantial local responsiveness and flexibility. For this 
reason, we expect that the number of TMTs expatriates from headquarter will strengthen the 
negative relationship between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance. 
Through a large sample of Obis from a consulting firm called Bureau van Dijk, our 
hypotheses are significantly supported. This study endeavours to make three contributions. 
Firstly, we go beyond the existing focus on how political hazards influence pre-entry 
international strategies by investigating the less-explored question on how MNCs manage 
political hazards and obtain superior performance after their foreign entries. Our significant 
moderating roles of both TMTs’ international experience in politically hazardous countries 
and the number of TMTs expatriates not only add a missing piece on exploring how MNCs 
manage political uncertainties in the post-entry period, but they also offer a contingent 
explanation for the inclusive findings on the relationship between political hazards and 





foreign subsidiary’s performance. Secondly, our contingent role of TMTs at subsidiary and 
from headquarter complements prior studies which focus on examining mitigating strategies 
for political hazards at the firm level or country level (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; 
Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Jiménez, Benito-Osorio, Puck, & Klopf, 2018; Lu et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, the contrasting moderating effects of local TMTs in the subsidiary and 
headquarter TMTs shed lights on two different roles of TMTs, namely application of their 
existing international knowledge and acts as MNCs’ agents to apply headquarters’ rules of 
international operations. Such different moderating roles of TMTs highlight that we need to 
carefully be aware of TMTs from headquarters will be a burden in countries with high 
political hazards. Thirdly, we extend TMTs literature in international business which largely 
focuses on general international experience without considering the exact content of 
international experience (S. Nielsen, 2010; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014; Sambharya, 
1996). Our significant moderating effects of TMTs international experience weighted by 
political hazards lends support to pay attention to what TMTs actually can learn from their 
prior experience.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Salience of Political Hazards 
Political hazards and their influences, have drawn increasing attention from scholars in 
international business and strategy area (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Delios & Henisz, 2003; 
Fitzpatrick, 1983; Kobrin, 1979b). By definition, political hazards indicate the instabilities 
and uncertainties arose from the host country government (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Under 





conditions of high-level political hazards, institutions cannot sustain policy-making credibility 
and policy makers are more likely to break the current policy structures (Henisz & Delios, 
2001). As a result, MNCs may not easily interpret or predict policies, nor could they secure 
their success of foreign investments.  
The impact of political hazards has consequences at various levels on MNCs’ foreign 
progresses through various channels. Directly, foreign firms’ profits or assets could be 
expropriated by governments with coercive power (Demirbag, Tatoglu, et al., 2007; Holburn 
& Zelner, 2010). This would happen if the host government was to seek political rents or 
deploy economic protectionism (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Faccio, 2006; Siegel, 2007). 
Indirectly, without stringent and stable regulations, contracts between foreign firms and local 
partners are more likely to be torn up (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). In addition, host country 
governments may make strong interventions to influence foreign firms’ market value, such as 
through increasing tax rates or setting prohibitions for market entries (Feinberg & Gupta, 
2009; Lu et al., 2018). Consequently, political hazards could downgrade MNCs’ effectiveness 
in leveraging resources and gaining profits in the host country (Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 
2015). 
Scholars have reached a widespread consensus that the political environment plays an 
important role in shaping MNCs’ behaviours and performance (W. J. Henisz, 2000; North, 
1990; Olson, 1996). To cope with high levels of political hazards, MNCs tend to reduce FDI 
flows to countries with high political hazards (Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998), 
select joint-venture mode (Witold J. Henisz, 2000; Lu et al., 2018; Luo, 2001) or enter 





markets under WTO and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) so as to counterbalance  
international institutions (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014).  
Political Hazards and Foreign Subsidiary’s Performance 
Institutions are devised to reduce uncertainties and regulate exchanges (North, 1990). Political 
hazards, perceived as an important element of host country institutions, will greatly influence 
MNCs’ foreign operations. The expectation is that foreign subsidiary in countries with high 
level of political hazards will have low performance. There are two mechanisms underlying 
the relationship between these phenomena.  
First, subsidiary faces extra costs for reducing political unfamiliarity and uncertainties, a 
budget which should be otherwise available for business purposes(Scott, 1987; Zaheer, 
1995). . If governments’ policies change frequently, firms are then forced to make substantial 
adjustments or cater for the authorities (Oliver, 1991, 1997). As a result, subsidiary would be 
burdened by huge expenditures on legitimacy processes, infrastructure buildings and other 
sunk investments (Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014). Firms exposed to high levels of political 
hazards would have to divert their available resources  away from focal business operations; 
leading to poor performance. 
Secondly, compared to local firms, political instabilities may disadvantage foreign 
subsidiary by treating them as outsiders (Lu et al., 2018; Zaheer, 1995). Indeed, host 
governments can form or enforce policies that normally consider local firms as first priorities. 
Although foreign subsidiary possesses stronger competitive capabilities and could gain higher 
profits in the local markets, their advantages may be offset by disadvantageous policies 
developed in host countries with political hazards in the host country (Zoogah et al., 2015).  





Firms’ assets and outputs could be easily expropriated, leading to a mounting loss in the 
foreign business (Minor, 1994).  
At the same time, we notice that MNCs can also benefit from political hazards because 
of the higher market power in the host countries. Indeed, within countries with high political 
hazards there is normally less competition than in stable countries because many MNCs are 
either reluctant to enter or tend to divest/exit if they perceive high political hazards (Dai et al., 
2013). In support of this, some studies show that political hazards lead to better performance 
when firms are able to navigate uncertainties (Jiménez & Delgado-García, 2012) and 
transform these in outstanding  returns (Beaulieu, Cosset, & Essaddam, 2006). In order to 
profit from these unfavourable conditions, the negative effects from substantial costs 
operating in high-level political hazard countries need to be effectively managed. We argue 
that the benefits are only profound when MNCs’ could have certain capabilities, this will 
discuss in our moderating effects. Thus, we propose 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a negative relationship between the level of political 
hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance. 
The Moderating Role of TMTs’ International Experience in Countries with High 
Political Hazards. 
An important but largely neglected contingency in the literature is the role of TMTs in 
mitigating the negative effects of political hazards for MNCs. This moderating role is well-
developed in strategy and management field but still not adequately explored in the 
international business sector. 





TMTs are the major decision-makers in the MNCs and the first responders to changing 
environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). A number of studies have demonstrated that TMTs 
promote firm performance (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Simons, 
Pelled, & Smith, 1999), including in international context (Herrmann & Datta, 2005; 
Sekiguchi, Bebenroth, & Li, 2011). TMTs’ characteristics influence whether MNCs will 
suffer from high transactions costs or will be able to exploit potential benefits in political 
hazardous host countries. In particular, we discuss two TMTs-related contingencies: pre-
existing foreign subsidiary TMTs’ (local TMTs) international experience in countries with 
high political hazards and the number of TMTs dispatched by headquarter.   
TMTs’ international experience is formed and shaped by their previous exposure 
(Sambharya, 1996) and plays a central role in reducing extra costs in host country with high 
political hazards. TMTs with low level of previous international experience in hazardous 
countries will invest extensive and unnecessary amounts of time and resources learning by 
trial and error how to take advantage of the unstable host country political environment. In 
contrast, TMTs with first-hand international experience in similar unstable contexts are able 
to deal with institutional uncertainty by being more sensitive to political signals and making 
quicker decisions in order to conform to local government requirements (Kobrin, 1984). .  
They have the expertise of both local successful political strategies and their MNCs culture 
and expectations (Sambharya, 1996) which will, in turn, directly reduce the company’s 
political engagement costs (Wu & Liu Cheng, 2011). .  
Given the advantageous knowledge of foreign institutions (Luo, 2005), TMT members 
are able to defend themselves through appropriate channels. By doing so, they can reassure 





governments’ biases so to eliminate host governments’ hostility towards outsider firms and 
avoid asset expropriation. 
Lastly, TMT  members with high level of international experience in political hazardous 
countries perform better at estimating risks (B. B. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011), perceiving and 
seizing opportunities (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). Given TMTs’ capability in 
evaluating, recognising and mitigating political hazards, costs can be reduced and benefits 
associated with political hazards in the host country can be increased. We contend that: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The negative relationship between political hazards and 
subsidiary’s foreign performance will be weakened in proportion to the local TMTs’ level 
of international experience in political hazardous countries. 
The Moderating Role of TMTs Dispatched by Headquarter 
In addition to the TMTs directly employed in the host countries (local), the MNCs normally 
dispatch their TMT members from headquarter as expatriates for the foreign subsidiaries. The 
main reasons of  doing it are  to control foreign operations through transferring expertise 
from headquarter to their network of subsidiaries and overseeing local operations to make 
sure interest alignment between headquarter and foreign subsidiaries (Foss & Pedersen, 2004; 
Kogut & Zander, 1993). However, given the changing environment of countries with high 
political hazards, we concern the effectiveness of such a dispatching of TMTs from the 
headquarter (Harzing, 1995; Hung-Wen, 2007).  
Firstly, TMTs from headquarter will face significant unfamiliarity in managing 
institutional distant operations. Driven by a well-established knowledge and experience, they 
are more confident in replicating their parent country approach and, therefore, reluctant to 





change (Reiche, Harzing, & Kraimer, 2009). Nonetheless,  political hazards in an 
international context are significantly incompatible with the standards of home countries. The 
degree and directionality of policies changes in entry criteria, legitimacy, licences, and 
industrial standards are commonly country-specific (Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Fisch & 
Zschoche, 2011) and require a great level of adaptability, especially from the TMTs of 
MNCs. Therefore, unfamiliarity will increase after TMTs’ intervention, leading to even 
higher coordination costs. 
Furthermore,  MNCs’ headquarter cannot effectively guide subsidiary’s decisions via 
dispatching TMTs (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). According to existing studies, positive 
outcomes are based on the (mis)assumption that headquarter and subsidiary have already 
shared common goals and aligned their reciprocal best practices (Gong, 2003; Song & Lee, 
2017). In reality, TMT members employed by headquarters for an international assignment 
are more likely to be loyal to and strictly follow the requirements of the headquarters. Their 
ultimate scope is that of enforcing headquarter’s interests on local subsidiary’s decisions, 
ignoring the changing demand needed in political hazardous countries. Taken together, we 
expect that: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The negative relationship between political hazards and foreign 
subsidiary’s performance will be strengthened when there is a large number of TMTs 
dispatched from headquarter. 
Figure 1 gives an illustration of our research model. 
****** Figure 1 goes about here ****** 








We test these hypotheses using panel data on international subsidiaries from the Orbis 
database. This database, compiled by a large consulting firm called Bureau van Dijk, is 
widely used in the international business field (Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010; Contractor, 
Yang, & Gaur, 2016). Orbis database provides detailed accounting and financial information 
on listed and unlisted firm across the globe. More importantly, it records the ownership 
linkage between headquarters and its international subsidiaries. This allows us to match 
subsidiaries’ information with their headquarter. Several selection criteria were used to select 
our sample subsidiaries: 1) subsidiaries who locate in foreign countries (i.e. the subsidiary’s 
country is different from its headquarters; 2) subsidiaries whose minimum 50.01% equity is 
controlled by a headquarter (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009); and 3) subsidiaries who have complete 
information on sales, return on assets, leverage, current assets, current liabilities, date of 
establishment, capital, employees, intangible assets.  
With the above restriction, the final sample includes 12,362 international subsidiaries 
and 8,597 headquarters, corresponding to 34,532 observations. The sample covers 54 host 
economies and 77 industries. The ten-year window covers a time period of 2004-2013. The 
political hazard information of host countries was collected from the Political Constraint 
Index (POLCON) Dataset. We then are able to calculate host country political risk and local 
TMTs’ experience in high-risk countries – two main independent variables that we consider 





in this paper. The other country-level data were collected from the World Bank database. All 
monetary variables are reported in US dollars. 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
This paper use return on assets, calculated as the net profit divided by total assets, to 
subsidiary-level firm performance. Return on assets has been widely used in the international 
business literature (Contractor et al., 2016; Jane W. Lu & Beamish, 2004; Qian, Li, Li, & 
Qian, 2008). This also helps to compare our results with those of previous studies. 
Independent variables 
Host country political risk. We employ the political constraints index (POLCON) developed 
by Witold J Henisz (2000) to measure host country political risk. POLCON has been widely 
used in the literature (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; Jiménez 
et al., 2018; Khoury et al., 2015) as a proxy of political risk since it measures an imperative 
determinant of foreign direct investment – how easily a government can change its rules 
arbitrarily and the credibility of its commitments to maintain the policies unchanged. The 
score of political constraint range from 0 to 1. The lower the values, the executive has more 
political discretion and could more easily change the existing policies at any point in time. 
Therefore, lower values imply higher risk. Note that political hazards equal –(political 
constraints) (Witold J Henisz, 2000). To avoid potential confusion in results interpretation, we 
reverse-code (multiply it by minus one) the political constraints and plus one. Possible score 
for this variable ranges from zero (least hazardous) to one (most hazardous). 





Local TMTs’ experience in high-risk countries. To measure subsidiary-level capability to 
manage political risk, we use TMTs’ tenure experience in foreign risky country. TMTs can 
acquire international experience via tenure abroad (Sambharya, 1996). Through international 
tenure experience in the political hazardous country, TMTs accumulates political risk 
experience of how to manage a company under high political uncertainty. Prior study argues 
that the number of high-risk subsidiaries within each MNC multinational network reflects 
MNCs’ experience in high-risk country (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). We extend this argument 
of MNCs’ experience to TMTs’ experience. To measure local TMTs’ experience in high-risk 
countries, we count the number of foreign high-risk countries (i.e. excluding the focal 
subsidiary’s country) where the focal firms’ TMTs have worked before within each TMTs 
tenure network. The high-risk countries were defined as those above the mean of country risk 
(i.e. 1-political constraints based on POLCON) calculated from the population of subsidiaries. 
The number of TMTs dispatched by headquarters. To measure this headquarter-level 
action to manage risk, we employ expatriate TMTs in the foreign subsidiary. Headquarters 
can influence subsidiary’s operation by sending different levels of expatriates. We exclude 
low-level expatriate and only keep the high-level one, since TMTs member are best personnel 
to transfer the knowledge from headquarters to subsidiaries (Song & Lee, 2017). Following 
prior studies (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000), we operationalize this variable as the number of 
TMT members who is dispatched (or rotated) from headquarters to focal subsidiaries in a 
given year. 
Control variables 





Country- and industry-specific characteristics. We control for institutional distance using the 
absolute difference of institution scores between host and home country (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
The institution score is based on the average of six dimensions in Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. The market potential was measured using GDP growth rate of host country, 
sourced from World Development Indicators. The market size was captured using GDP per 
capita (Laeven & Levine, 2009). Finally, we use host country industry concentration to 
control for the competition within each industry in the host country, which is calculated as 
one minus top-four-firm sales concentration ratio in each industry (Ho, Wu, & Xu, 2011).  
Headquarter-specific characteristics. To measure MNCs’ experience in high-risk 
countries, we follow (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009) and take the total count of MNCs’ foreign 
subsidiaries in high-risk countries. High-risk subsidiaries were defined as those above the 
mean of country risk (i.e. 1-political constraints based on POLCON) calculated from the 
population of subsidiaries. We control for MNCs’ international experience using 
multinationality, which is operationalized as the ratio of the number of overseas subsidiaries 
to total subsidiaries. We use the number of partners (i.e. owners of the focal subsidiaries, 
focal headquarters excluded) to control for the other partners’ influence on the focal 
subsidiary’s decision making and performance (Meschi & Wassmer, 2013). We also control 
for headquarters’ prior commitment on the focal subsidiary (Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 
1990), using the percentage of subsidiary’s equity owned by its focal headquarter in prior 
year. 
Subsidiary firm-specific characteristics. Prior research suggests that several firm 
heterogeneity variables may influence firm performance. Thus, we control for heterogeneous 





firm characteristics such as slack available, slack potential (Ref & Shapira, 2017), firm age 
(Jiménez et al., 2018), sales (Sambharya, 1996), capital (Driffield, Love, & Yang, 2016), and 
intangibles (Chen & Steiner, 1999). In addition, we control for time fixed effects (Piaskowska 
& Trojanowski, 2014) and parent-affiliate fixed effects (Driffield et al., 2016).      
 
RESULTS 
Our sample structure is a panel data. To reduce the reverse causality, all independent 
variables are lagged by one year (Lin, 2014). As the Hausman test revealed that explanatory 
variables were correlated with the unobserved effects (p<0.05), and thus, panel regression 
with fixed effects was used in our analysis. In the meantime, we also added year dummies, 
and headquarter-subsidiary linkages dummies. Tables 1 and 2 reports the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in our analysis and the matrix of correlations coefficients. Table 2 shows 
that the highest correlation coefficient in Table 1 is 0.6. We also examined the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) of each model after our regression analyses. All the VIF scores are 
below 4, confirming that multi-collinearity is not a major issue in our analyses. Table A1 (in 
Appendix A) presents the distribution of foreign subsidiaries in our sample. Clearly in Table 
A1, we can see large variances of political hazards across countries in our sample, from 0.3 
(lowest political hazard) to 1 (highest political hazard). This shows our samples are 
representative for testing our hypotheses. 
****** Tables 1 and 2 go about here ****** 
Table 4 presents the results of our panel regression model. Model 1 contains our 
country-, industry- and firm-level control variables. Model 2 adds the main variable and 





moderating variables. Model 3 and Model 4 include the interaction terms to test our 
hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 4 is the full model. We conducted Wald tests on the inclusion of 
the independent variables and interaction terms in each model. The results further confirm 
that the inclusion of the main variables and interaction terms significantly fit of each model 
(p<0.05). Similarly, all the model shows the consistent results 
****** Table 4 goes about here ****** 
In terms of the interest, as shown in the Model 2, we find that the relationship between 
host country political risk and foreign subsidiary’s performance are significantly negative (-
0.0207, p<0.05). This supports the negative argument is dominant in our samples, indicating 
that political hazards are threatening foreign subsidiary’s performance, confirming 
Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the negative relationship between host country political risk 
and foreign subsidiary’s performance is weakened when local TMTs has high level of 
international experience in countries with high political hazards. As shown in Model 3, the 
significant and positive interaction term (0.1284, p<0.05) between host country political risk 
and local TMTs’ experience in high-risk countries support Hypothesis 2. It clearly confirms 
that local TMTs’ experiencing high-level political hazard in the past will facilitate foreign 
operations. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the significantly negative coefficients of the 
interaction term (-0.0246, p<0.05) in Model 4 shows that the negative relationship between 
host country political risk and foreign subsidiary’s performance is weakened when there is a 
large number of TMTs dispatched by headquarters, lending support to our Hypothesis 3. 





To further show our moderating effects in a visionary way, we plotted marginal 
moderating effects based on the full model (Model 4 in Table 3). Figure 2 shows the 
interaction between host country political risk and moderating variables. In Figure 2a, we 
changed the value of local TMTs’ international experience in countries with high political 
hazards from low level of local TMTs’ experience (i.e. the mean minus two standard 
deviations) to high level of local TMTs’ experience (i.e. the mean plus two standard 
deviations). The positive slope in Figure supports our Hypothesis 2. In contrast, we adopted 
the same method to plot Figure 2b. The negative slope further confirms that the negative 
relationship between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance is worsened 
when there is a large number of TMTs dispatched by headquarters.  
 ****** Table 3 and Figure 2 go about here ****** 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our aim was to investigate how MNCs could effectively manage political hazards and 
increase their subsidiary’s performance after entry. Through a sample of MNCs across 54 
countries, we have highlighted the significant contingent roles of TMTs in the relationship 
between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance. In particular, our results 
show that there is no significant relationship between political hazards and foreign 
subsidiary’s performance. However, the negative relationship between political hazards and 
foreign subsidiary’s performance is significantly weakened when local TMTs have previously 
gained international experience in countries with high political hazards. In contrast, we have 
also demonstrated that the negative relationship between political hazards and foreign 





subsidiary’s performance is significantly strengthened when there is a large number of TMTs 
members dispatched by the headquarters. Our study contributes to the literature on political 
hazards, TMTs and international business in several ways.  
Firstly, we move beyond past research which largely focuses on the impact of political 
hazards on pre-entry strategies. Although there is a shared conclusion that political hazards 
drive MNCs to either avoid or at least minimize their risk exposure in pre-entry strategies 
(Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Lu et al., 2018), we still have limited knowledge about how 
MNCs dynamically manage political hazards and achieve superior foreign subsidiary 
performance across time. Our direct investigation of TMTs’ moderating role in the 
relationship between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance addressed this 
gap.  
Secondly, although there are a few exceptions examining performance implications of 
political hazards, our current findings are inclusive (Dai et al., 2013; Getachew & Beamish, 
2017; Jiménez & Delgado-García, 2012; Liu et al., 2016). Instead of testing costs or 
opportunity arguments separately, our findings on the contingent role of TMTs extend this 
line of research by confirming that whether political hazards are a threat or rather an 
opportunity depends on the extent of how MNCs exploit their TMTs’ knowledge and 
capabilities in their foreign subsidiaries. The significant findings in this study support that 
local TMTs with substantial experience in high political hazardous countries will weaken the 
negative relationship between political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance while 
the number of TMTs members sent from the headquarters have the opposite effects. Such 
significant moderating effects of TMTs identify the boundaries for the relationship between 





political hazards and subsidiary’s performance, offering an important justification for the 
prior mixed findings.  
Furthermore, the significant moderating roles of TMTs in the relationship between 
political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance shed light on the need to consider the 
interactions between TMTs and institutions in influencing firms’ performance. Prior literature 
on mitigating political hazards dominantly focuses on factors occurring at the headquarter 
level (i.e. (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Jiménez et al., 2018; 
Lu et al., 2018)). Until recently, several scholars such as Giambona et al. (2017) or Buckley, 
Chen, Clegg, and Voss (2018) have pointed out the important role of TMTs’ experience and 
risk-preferences in overseas risk management. The current study not only shares similar 
interests in acknowledging TMTs’ significant influences on international success, but it also 
complements this line of research by representing the different roles of TMTs locally 
deployed at the subsidiary level as well as of those coming from the headquarter. We have 
concluded that subsidiary’s TMTs with an extensive pre-international experience in 
politically hazardous countries will facilitate political hazards management and increase the 
overall performance of the subsidiary. However, TMTs from headquarter are not so helpful 
for managing political hazards in foreign subsidiary. The increasing number of TMTs coming 
from the headquarters will most likely sacrifice the extent of flexibility and adaptability; two 
crucial concepts for surviving in unstable foreign environments. Compared to Song and Lee 
(2017)’s study, which finds MNCs’ foreign subsidiary in hostile market condition are less 
likely to divest if there is a large number of TMTs dispatched from their headquarters, our 
opposite moderating effects of TMTs in this study highlight the distinctive performance 





implications of TMTs from headquarters in hostile economic environment and political 
environment.  
Lastly, our study also extend literature on TMTs international experience. TMTs 
international experience has been well documented in international business and assumed as a 
facilitator for MNCs’ international expansion (S. Nielsen, 2010; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 
2014; Sambharya, 1996). However, TMTs international experience in prior studies are 
general international knowledge. Our results of the positive moderating role of subsidiary’s 
TMTs international experience weighted by political hazards in the relationship between 
political hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance, on the one hand, share the similar 
findings that international knowledge of TMTs has substantial influence on international 
operations. On the other hand, we advanced this literature by explicitly testing the positive 
role of TMTs who actually learn from politically hazardous environment. This demonstrates a 
more refined and in-depth understanding of TMTs in MNCs’ international success.  
Implications 
Our findings have important implications for MNCs’ managers. In order to reduce loss and 
increase gain in operating countries with high political hazards, our findings help MNCs’ 
managers better understand how to manage efficiently in countries with high political hazards 
after entry. Our findings suggest that MNCs should allocate full flexibilities to local 
operations in order to respond to the dynamic political environment in the host country. More 
specifically, for international success, our findings suggest that MNCs could hire executives 
who have rich working experience in politically hazardous countries to facilitate foreign 
operations. At the same time, MNCs should also be aware of dispatching many TMTs from 





headquarters that may inhibit foreign subsidiary’s capabilities to respond to the highly 
changing environment.   
Limitations 
Despite the several strengths reported in the study, some limitations can be identified that will 
offer opportunities for future research. The current study   focuses exclusively on the 
contingent role of TMTs’ international experience in the relationship between political 
hazards and foreign subsidiary’s performance. It would be promising to extend the 
investigation to other characteristics of TMTs, such as their demographic diversity or their 
tenure (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This would provide a more comprehensive view of how 
managers influence MNCs’ business success. Another limitation, and in line with prior 
studies in international business area (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Song & Lee, 2017), is that 
we consider TMT members dispatched from the headquarter as interchangeably covering the 
functions of knowledge transfer and  agent of direct control to ensure that the interests 
between headquarter and foreign subsidiary are always aligned. A new line of research could 
go beyond these two functions and distinguish them so to have an in-depth understanding of 
how expatriates can contribute to manage politically unstable environments.   
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Table 1 Operationalization of Variables 
Variable Operationalization Source 
Subsidiary’s 
performance 
The focal subsidiary’s return on assets using net income. Orbis 
Host country political 
risk 
One minus Polconiii in the Political Constraint Index 





The number of high-risk countries (i.e. above the mean of 
country risk calculated from the population of subsidiaries) in 
        
   
POLCON, 
Orbis 
The number of TMT 
dispatched by 
 
The number of expatriates in the focal subsidiary. The 
logarithm transformation is applied. 
Orbis 
Institutional distance The absolute difference of institution scores (the mean of six 
dimensions in WGI) between host country and home country. 
WGI 
GDP growth rate The host country’s GDP per capita (%). WDI 
GDP per capita The logarithm of the host country’s GDP per capita (US$). WDI 
Host country industry 
concentration 
One minus top-four-firm sales concentration ratio in each 
industry of host country. 
Orbis 
MNCs’ experience in 
high-risk countries 
The number of MNCs’ high-risk subsidiaries (i.e. above the 
mean of country risk calculated from the population of 
      
   
POLCON, 
Orbis 
Multinationality The ratio of the number of overseas subsidiaries to total 
subsidiaries. 
Orbis 
Number of partners The logarithm of the total number of partners (focal 





The level of ownership controlled by the focal headquarter in 
prior year (%). 
Orbis 
Slack available The logarithm of the focal subsidiary’s current assets to 
current liabilities ratio.  
Orbis 
Slack potential The focal subsidiary’s debt to equity ratio. Orbis 
Firm age The logarithm of the focal subsidiary’s duration of the 
existence since the date of establishment. 
Orbis 
Sales The logarithm of the focal subsidiary’s total sales. Orbis 
Capital The logarithm of the focal subsidiary’s total fixed capital 
divided by the number of employees. 
Orbis 
Intangibles The logarithm of the focal subsidiary’s intangible assets 
(US$). 
Orbis 





Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs 
Subsidiary’s performance 0.03 0.05 34,532 
Host country political risk 0.54 0.12 34,532 
Local TMT’s experience in high-risk countries 0.07 0.17 34,532 
The number of TMT dispatched by headquarter 0.27 0.50 34,532 
Institutional distance 0.40 0.45 34,532 
GDP growth rate 0.01 0.03 34,532 
GDP per capita 10.52 0.46 34,532 
Host country industry concentration 0.75 0.13 34,532 
MNCs’ experience in high-risk countries 1.90 1.49 34,532 
Multinationality 0.94 0.14 34,532 
Number of partners 0.34 0.48 34,532 
Ownership by focal headquarter 0.90 0.18 34,532 
Slack available 1.11 0.65 34,532 
Slack potential 0.88 1.20 34,532 
Firm age 2.75 0.82 34,532 
Sales 16.92 2.27 34,532 
Capital 10.47 2.52 34,532 
Intangibles 5.53 6.80 34,532 
 





Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Subsidiary’s performance 1.00 
                 
2. Host country political risk -0.03 1.00 
                
3. Local TMT’s experience in high-risk countries 0.01 0.25 1.00 
               
4. The number of TMT dispatched by headquarter 0.02 0.03 0.22 1.00 
              
5. Institutional distance -0.05 0.20 -0.06 -0.15 1.00 
             
6. GDP growth rate 0.03 -0.04 -0.13 -0.04 0.07 1.00 
            
7. GDP per capita 0.03 -0.27 0.03 0.13 -0.60 -0.10 1.00 
           
8. Host country industry concentration -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.01 1.00 
          
9. MNCs’ experience in high-risk countries 0.03 -0.15 0.07 0.20 -0.12 -0.04 0.13 0.00 1.00 
         
10. Multinationality -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.07 1.00 
        
11. Number of partners 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.27 -0.07 1.00 
       
12. Ownership by focal headquarter -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.17 -0.02 -0.17 1.00 
      
13. Slack available 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
     
14. Slack potential -0.13 0.10 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.23 1.00 
    
15. Firm age 0.07 -0.13 0.00 0.08 -0.18 -0.02 0.19 0.01 0.18 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
   
16. Sales 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.11 -0.23 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.27 -0.07 0.20 -0.09 -0.21 0.14 0.25 1.00 
  
17. Capital -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.14 0.04 0.25 1.00 
 
18. Intangibles -0.05 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.17 -0.04 -0.13 0.09 0.02 0.41 0.30 1.00 
Notes: Correlation coefficients with values larger than |0.15| are significant at over 10% level.





Table 4 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Model for Host Country Political Risk and Subsidiary Performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Direct effects 
     
Host country political risk 
 
-0.0207** -0.0237** -0.0175* -0.0205** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Local TMT’s experience in high-risk countries 
 
-0.0017 -0.0789** -0.0012 -0.0823** 
  
(0.003) (0.039) (0.003) (0.039) 
The number of TMT dispatched by headquarter 
 
0.0015 0.0014 0.0138** 0.0143** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Moderating effects 
     









Host country political risk*The number of TMT dispatched by headquarter 
   
-0.0246** -0.0256** 
    
(0.012) (0.012) 
Controls 
     
Country level 
     
Institutional distance 0.0020 0.0025 0.0026 0.0024 0.0025 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDP growth rate 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 






(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.0107** -0.0090* -0.0098** -0.0095** -0.0104** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industry level 
     
Host country industry concentration 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0036 0.0037 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Parent level 
     
MNCs’ experience in high-risk countries 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Multinationality 0.0166*** 0.0165*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0163*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of partners -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ownership by focal headquarter 0.0090*** 0.0091*** 0.0090*** 0.0091*** 0.0090*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Subsidiary level 
     
Slack available -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Slack potential -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.0026 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 






(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sales 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intangibles -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj R-squared 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.403 
No. observation 34532 34532 34532 34532 34532 
F statistics 16.501 14.784 14.397 14.337 13.991 
Notes: Dependent variable is subsidiary’s performance. All columns control time fixed effects and parent-affiliate fixed effects. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance 
levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01.










Figure 2: Moderating Effects of Local TMT’s Experience in High-Risk Countries and The Number of 
TMT Dispatched by Headquarter 
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Table A1: The Number of Firms and Main Variables for Each Economy 
Economy N Subsidiary’s performance Host country political risk 
Australia 4 0.04 0.50 
Austria 309 0.04 0.57 
Bangladesh 1 0.10 0.64 
Belgium 1401 0.03 0.30 
Brazil 2 0.09 0.84 
Bulgaria 23 0.02 0.50 
Canada 1 0.04 0.55 
China 2 -0.02 1.00 
Colombia 3 0.05 0.80 
Cyprus 10 0.04 0.49 
Czech Republic 3 0.01 0.48 
Denmark 1 0.00 0.45 
Estonia 183 0.03 0.48 
Finland 268 0.03 0.46 
France 313 0.03 0.48 
Germany 950 0.03 0.51 
Ghana 1 0.06 0.64 
Greece 2 0.07 0.61 
Hong Kong 13 0.05 1.00 
Hungary 11 0.04 0.63 
India 11 0.07 0.36 
Indonesia 9 0.05 0.75 
Ireland 466 0.03 0.55 
Israel 3 0.03 0.42 
Jordan 1 0.04 0.93 
Kazakhstan 1 0.08 1.00 
Kuwait 1 0.04 0.53 
Latvia 269 0.03 0.46 
Lithuania 2 0.05 0.45 
Luxembourg 74 0.04 0.52 
Malaysia 3 0.07 0.50 
Morocco 1 0.12 0.69 
Netherlands 446 0.03 0.38 
Nigeria 4 0.07 0.65 
Norway 2 0.06 0.49 
Philippines 4 0.06 0.77 
Poland 9 0.04 0.65 
Portugal 1 0.05 0.59 
Romania 352 0.03 0.71 
Russia 672 0.02 0.67 
Singapore 2 0.00 0.97 
Slovakia 1 0.00 0.48 
Slovenia 23 0.04 0.47 
South Africa 4 0.07 0.58 
South Korea 44 0.04 0.58 
Spain 900 0.02 0.64 
Sri Lanka 2 0.00 0.60 
Sweden 574 0.04 0.49 
Thailand 2 0.05 0.66 
Turkey 1 -0.01 0.63 
UK 4954 0.03 0.61 
US 16 0.03 0.60 
Ukraine 6 0.00 0.63 
Zimbabwe 1 -0.01 0.64 
Notes: The table covers 54 host economies. There are 12,362 overseas subsidiaries and 8,597 
headquarters. 
